Planning and preparation: 10 – 16 September 1944
On the narrow corridor that would carry the armoured drive, there were five major bridges to take. They had to be seized intact by airborne assault. It was the fifth, the crucial bridge over the Lower Rhine at a place called Arnhem, 64 miles behind the German lines, that worried Lieut.-General Frederick ‘Boy’ Browning, Deputy Commander, First Allied Airborne Army. Pointing at the Arnhem bridge, on the map, he asked ‘How long will it take the armour to reach us?’. Field Marshal Montgomery replied briskly, ‘Two days.’ Still looking at the map, Browning answered ‘We can hold it for four.’ Then he added ‘But, sir, I think, we may be going a bridge too far’.
The final conference at Montgomery’s Headquarters on ‘Operation Market-Garden’, September 10th 1944.
The recent rapid advances caused Allied intelligence assessments to slide from optimism to fantasy: the Allied Intelligence Committee wrote that ‘no organised [German] resistance may be expected after 1 December 1944: indeed, it may well end before that date’ and the (British Government) War Office’s Director of Operations wrote on 6 September ‘If we continue to advance at the same pace as that of recent weeks we should be in Berlin on 28 September’.
The Netherlands – Nederlands in Dutch [literally translated as the low or lower lands] was in past times (with Belgium) actually called The Low Countries. It is divided by very many waterways, both natural rivers and man-made canals, which impede advancing armies by providing defensive stop lines.
British Army Corps map showing available routes AIR 37/1249
With Eisenhower’s endorsement, Montgomery ordered Lieut.-General Frederick ‘Boy’ Browning, Deputy Commander, First Allied Airborne Army, to return to England to start immediate detailed planning and set 17 September – just one week later – as the D-Day (day operation was to be executed).
Air Marshal Tedder (centre) Deputy Supreme Allied Commander conferring with
Lieutenant-General Frederick Browning, Deputy Commander, First British Airborne Division
and Brigadier-General Floyd Parks, Chief of Staff to Lieutenant-General Brereton, Commander First Allied Airborne Division,
in front of Horsa Gliders (obviously for publicity purposes)
His plan was for a lightning airborne strike on the northernmost bridge from the front-line at the Meuse-Escaut Canal, just north of Leopoldsburg, on the Belgian/Dutch border, to Arnhem over the Neder Rijn [Lower Rhine], to prevent the Germans demolishing it, and then holding it until relieved by land forces (British Army XXX Corps).
But to achieve this required the simultaneous seizing by airborne troops of 4 intervening major bridges over which the relieving force would have to travel. The distance from the start line to Arnhem is some 65 miles and Montgomery calculated that, with all the bridges quickly seized intact, British Army XXX Corps could reach Arnhem in two days.
The final stage of the operation would be glider-borne engineers arriving to build an Advanced Landing Ground near Arnhem for Dakotas to ferry in further forces.
The airborne assault on the bridges was code-named Operation MARKET and the ground follow-up and relief Operation GARDEN.
On 14 September, Montgomery issued his ‘Operational Appreciation M 525’ summarising his plan.
Field Order No 4 for Operation Market, The National Archives AIR 25-705
This did not specifically name Arnhem as the target and was broader: dominating the area beyond Arnhem to the Zuider Zee [now Ijsselmeer] to cut off German armies to the west, seizing the Scheldt Estuary (to open the port of Antwerp to Allied shipping), occupation of the Ruhr and a powerful thrust into northern Germany.
And increasingly important, capture and occupy the areas of Belgium and Holland from which the V-1 and V-2 weapons were being launched. Market Garden itself was not named but D-Day for ‘the operation’ was set as 17 September. [Full text in ‘2nd Tactical Air’ Force, Shores & Thomas p291 – see bibliography.]
Basic campaign map, AIR 37/1249
The total resources upon which Montgomery called were indeed vast: airborne attacks would involve 35,000 men – 24,500 American and 10,500 British and Polish – twice the number dropped on Normandy, an operation which took six months to plan, and would be 300 miles from their southern English bases. Of this total, 12,000 were to land by 2,500 gliders and the remaining 23,000 by parachute.
And not just men: artillery guns, jeeps, lorries, ammunition, food, medical stores, the whole paraphernalia of a modern army. Supporting these forces would be 1,500 fighters, light and heavy bombers, reconnaissance and air-sea rescue forces. A total of 4,700 aircraft and 2,500 gliders (British and American); the transports alone using 24 airfields.
Marshalling instructions for Halifax tug/Horsa glider launches AIR 14/3650
A crucial problem was the inadequate number of transport aircraft allotted to Market, or, critics might say, the air-lift resources demanded by Montgomery simply did not exist. So instead of landing all troops in one day – the preferred choice of the 1st Airborne Army planners – landings would have to be over three consecutive days.
Consideration was given to transports flying two sorties on the first day, but this was discounted: there was not enough daylight, insufficient time to carry out maintenance and repair battle damage between sorties and tired aircrew would make mistakes.
Two aerial highways, each with three parallel tracks, had to be drawn to and from the Drop Zones [parachutists] and Landing Zones [gliders], of which there were many – 5 alone for Arnhem – avoiding known flak [Flieger Abwehr Kanonen – Anti Aircraft Artillery] sites and Luftwaffe airfields.
Left: German flak defences AIR 25/705, Right: Aerial reconnaissance photo flak sites AIR 14/3650
And down on the North Sea, a chain of Air Sea Rescue launches for the inevitable forced landings. Some of these ASR launches also carried Eureka radio navigation beacons. Seventeen launches were deployed under the two ‘corridors’, each launch being within sight of its neighbours so there were no gaps where an aircraft or glider might ditch unnoticed.
Over the four main days, RAF rescue launches recovered 205 personnel from 35 gliders and one Dakota; naval vessels recovered a further 79 from the waters.
Top: Detail of DZ/LZ AIR 25/705, Bottom: Aerial Highways to Drop and Landing Zones AIR 25/705
Previous major airborne assaults had been by night but, at Normandy even with full moonlight, landings were scattered and casualties high. Operation Market would be by day to achieve better concentration and by night there would have been no moon.
Also the risk from the Luftwaffe would be lower by day: German radar-equipped night fighters could have cause devastation amongst the slow transports but by day, Allied day fighter escorts were more effective. Another potent reason for day operations was the American experience at Normandy.
Unlike the RAF, where all aircrew were trained to fly at night, only limited numbers of USAAF aircrew had this capability and the Normandy ‘follow-my-leader’ style of navigation had proven wholly inadequate.
2 V Son Bridge (2024): Author
Grave Bridge (2024): Author
The American 101st Airborne Division (‘Screaming Eagles’) would capture the Best, Son and Veghel bridges in the Eindhoven area; the 82nd (‘All American’) the Grave and Nijmegen bridges; and the 1st British Airborne Division and 1st Polish Parachute Brigade the Arnhem road and rail bridges.
Nijmegen Bridge (2024): Author
Detail Arnhem – Nijmegen with DZ/LZ AIR 20/2209
Responsibility for troop transport aircraft for the Arnhem drops was allocated as follows: 38 and 46 Groups, RAF, would undertake all pathfinder-parachutist dropping and all glider towing, together with subsequent resupply missions. The United States IXth Troop Carrier Command would carry out all main-force parachute drops.
The Drop Zones and Landing Zones for Arnhem were problematic. The northern end of the road bridge was in a densely populated major city so was not available and the southern side was considered unsuitable, being low-lying, wet and bisected by multiple drainage ditches and embankments.
Flak concentrations around Arnhem and the Luftwaffe airfield at Deelen had to be avoided so areas to the north and south of the railway line west of Wolfheze were chosen.
But these were some 8 miles west of the road bridge. And 4 miles west of the small village of Oosterbeek, a name to be encountered very soon.
A further, risky, decision was taken regarding the Polish Airborne Brigade’s landing zones: the original plan was that their gliders – containing all the heavy equipment, such as guns, jeep, ammunition etc. – were to using Landing Zone L on D+2, north of the Rhine, whereas the main force of infantry was scheduled to arrive by parachute on D+3, dropping south of the river.
Allocation of Bases/Squadrons to each force DZ/LZ AIR 25/705
Air support was planned to be comprehensive and allocated as follows:
(a) on D-Day, all flak positions along the route to be attacked by US 8th Air Force (8AF) and RAF Air Defence Great Britain (ADGB) squadrons;
(b) throughout the whole operation, 8AF to provide light escort over the north-east and heaviest cover possible over the rest of the route, both to and from dropping zones;
(c) after landings, cover to be maintained over the landing areas by US 9th Air Force (9AF) by day and ADGB at night;
(d) Bomber Command aircraft to attack enemy day fighter airfields and fixed flak positions on D-1;
(e) Bomber Command to drop dummy parachutists away from Arnhem on the night of D/D+1 [17/18 September];
(f) aircraft of 2 Group to attack vehicle parks in the dropping and landing zone area, to finish by H-25 [25 minutes before landings start];
(g) 2TAF to carry out armed reconnaissance in the dropping and landing zone area; and
(h) Coastal Command to carry out diversionary missions outside the area of airborne operations.
Market-Garden was highly complex and all elements were interdependent and mission-critical – five bridges to be taken immediately and intact, 64 miles of highway captured, 3 consecutive days of airborne troop insertion and then resupply drops before the arrival of British Army XXX Corps, plus tactical air support.
The failure of any one element would mean the entire operation would fail.
Two other, crucial, essentials for success were totally beyond British control: good flying weather in Britain and Belgium over three consecutive days; and the accuracy of the intelligence assumptions that German resistance would be weak and consist of a few second-line, disorganised, troops.
German defensive forces AIR 25/705
The RAF’s role in this week-long planning stage was modest, predominantly reconnaissance.
From top to bottom: A) Photo Reconnaissance de Havilland Mosquito. High level camouflage of PRU Blue.
B) Mosquito: note three camera ports just aft of nose.
C) Spitfire FR IXc – this one is in low-level pink colour scheme for dawn and dusk. Called ‘dicing’, As in ‘dicing with death’.
D) Modern repainting (colour actually faded to off-white in service). © Airliners.net
E) Photo Reconnaissance Spitfires had cameras in place of radio sets.
High-level photographs of the bridges, landing areas, defences and the ground routes were essential and delivered. However, in the film ‘A Bridge Too Far’, a great deal of importance is placed upon one low-level reconnaissance photo allegedly showing the presence of German panzers [heavy tanks] near the landing grounds.
Panzers did fight at Arnhem, as the soldiers soon found out to their extreme cost, but British intelligence did not consider them to be a credible threat to Market. The photograph is mentioned in Cornelius Ryan’s book – upon which the film was based – but an intensely-researched treatise by the RAF’s Air Historical Branch on the intelligence available to all British (and American) armies from every source – principally aerial photography – casts very serious doubt on the existence of this photograph, or at least, as described by Ryan and the film (see bibliography).
Film photo of Panzers at Arnhem: https://www.battledetective.com/casefiles19.html
RAF Medmenham Photographic Interpretation Centre: analyst using stereoscopic viewer for 3-D effect.
Was it a genuine photo, that every experienced researcher has missed; a genuine photo but at a different time and place; or a Hollywood falsification?
On 17 September 2024 (80th Anniversary of Operation Market Garden), Dr Sebastian Ritchie, author of the Royal Air Force Air Historical Branch’s paper mentioned above, gave a comprehensively-referenced and more extensive lecture at RAF Museum Midlands on the history of RAF aerial reconnaissance at Arnhem. He specifically discussed the low-level panzer photograph and the reasons to doubt it was genuine. Dr Ritchie’s conclusion was unambiguous: no such photograph could be found and the one portrayed in the film was a Hollywood fabrication – the tanks shown were post-war German Leopards. The talk was recorded and can be seen for FREE on the Museum’s Crowdcast Channel.
Available to attack German positions in the planning week were aircraft of Bomber Command and 2TAF, the latter based on temporary Advanced Landing Grounds in Belgium. But neither’s records show much activity in that area; coupled no doubt with a desire not to alert German defences.
Author’s Note: RAF Museum has very kindly provided access to documents and photographs but the views expressed herein are the author’s alone.
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER READING
- 2nd Tactical Air Force: Volume Two Breakout to Bodenplatte, Christopher Shores and Chris Thomas: Classic/Ian Allan 2004
- A Bridge Too Far cinema film directed by Joseph Levene, directed by Richard Attenborough Released by United Artists 1977
- A Bridge Too Far, Cornelius Ryan; Hamish Hamilton 1974
- Airborne Operations Air Historical Branch Air Ministry 1951
- Arnhem: the Air Reconnaissance Story, Dr Sebastian Ritchie; Air Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence 2019
- Bomber Command War Diaries Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt, Viking/Penguin 1985
- Slag om Arnhem/Theirs is the Glory’ filmed 1945 distributed by Airborne Museum Hartenstein, Oosterbeek, Netherlands
- The National Archives
AIR 14/3650 Arnhem: Campaign collection of photographs 38 Group
AIR 20/2209 Operation Market: British Airborne effort
AIR 25/705 Operations Record Book: 83 Group
AIR 37/1249 21st Army Group: Operation Market Garden
Earlier successful resupply drop. The National Archives AIR 14/3650
Author via The War Graves Photographic Project
RAF Down Ampney – gliders and tugs
Hamilcar disgorging Vickers light tank
Green on. Go!
Air landing and Paratroops congregate AIR 14/3650
