Tag: falklands40

Bravo November

Chinook ZA718 ‘Bravo November’ is one of the most famous aircraft in the RAF and it is very exciting that this historic aircraft is now part of the RAF Museum’s collection. Bravo November’s arrival at the RAF Museum also coincides with the 40th anniversary of the Falklands conflict, which saw the first operational use by the RAF of its newly acquired Boeing Chinooks. Using material from the RAF Museum archive and interviews, I will explore the activities of Chinooks during the Falklands Conflict, focussing particularly on ZA718 ‘Bravo November’ and the notable events in which it was involved.

The US Army began operating the Chinook in 1962 and it soon saw active service in Vietnam where its exceptional load carrying qualities were quickly recognised. For the RAF the Chinook was the obvious replacement for the problematic Bristol Belvedere and in 1967 an order was placed for 15 aircraft. However, the order was cancelled due to cuts in defence expenditure. It would be another 11 years before the RAF were able to purchase the Chinook. In 1978 the Ministry of Defence announced the purchase of 33 Chinooks.

The first aircraft were received by the Chinook Flight of No. 240 Operational Conversion Unit at RAF Odiham in December 1980. The following August, No. 18 Squadron was reformed to become the first of three RAF squadrons to be equipped with the new helicopter.

No. 18 Squadron’s Chinooks were soon called into action, when in April 1982 the Falkland Islands were invaded and occupied by Argentinian forces. Against the background of diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation, the British Government swiftly decided to send an all-arms force to attempt the recapture of the Falkland Islands over 8,000 miles away. No. 18 Squadron were soon involved, flying stores and supplies to ships of the task force being assembled at Devonport, this included flying a 5-ton propeller bearing to HMS Invincible at sea in the English Channel, having very publicly departed Portsmouth the day before, thus avoiding an embarrassing return to port for repair.

It was evident that helicopters were to play an important part in any operation to recapture the Falklands, for ‘ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore, lift of freight and personnel, for direct support of troops ashore and for Anti-Submarine Warfare’. The Royal Navy were able to provide much of the helicopter resources to meet these needs but lacked a heavy lift helicopter and the RAF’s Chinooks were the only aircraft that could fulfil this capability gap.

Six aircraft were rapidly prepared to join the Task Force, receiving modifications which improved the aircrafts’ survivability and operational capabilities. This included the installation of chaff dispensers, infra-red flare decoy dispensers, radar warning receivers and fittings for a General-Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG). Options of how many and how to get the Chinooks to the South Atlantic were explored. One possibility was that the aircraft would fly down via ‘ship hopping’ to avoid difficult areas and countries. This was ultimately dismissed as it would have tied up too many resources. Eventually it was decided that due to space constraints only five aircraft would be despatched onboard the container ship MV Atlantic Conveyor. Atlantic Conveyor would disembark one Chinook at Ascension Island, an important staging post for operations in the South Atlantic, the remaining four aircraft would head south to participate in operations to recapture the Falklands.

The Atlantic Conveyor sailed from Portsmouth on 25 April arriving at Ascension on 5 May where, within 90 minutes of disembarkation, Chinook ZA707, was on task conducting vertical resupply sorties. ZA707 remained at Ascension for the remainder of the conflict mostly on vertical replenishment operations but also on other tasks, such as carrying early warning radar equipment to the top of Green Mountain, the highest point on the island, which ‘could only have been achieved with the Chinook’. ZA707 flew over 100 hours during the conflict and on one day alone transported over 350 tons of stores to ships of the Task Force.

Eight British Aerospace Sea Harriers and six Harrier GR3s were embarked on the Atlantic Conveyor at Ascension and she sailed on 7 May to join the ships of the Task Force in the South Atlantic. On 18 May, as Atlantic Conveyor closed with the Task Force, the Sea Harriers and Harriers were prepared for flight and over the next few days all had departed for HMS Invincible and HMS Hermes. With more space now available work began preparing the helicopters for flight. Removing them from their protective cocoons and refitting rotor blades, this proved to be a difficult task within the confines of the ship. No specialist lifting equipment was available and a forklift truck was impressed to assist.

As the Chinooks were being made ready, British forces landed ashore at San Carlos on the west coast of East Falkland on 21 May. With the beachhead established, the need for helicopter logistic support was great. Helicopters would be crucial to the success of the ground campaign. With no proper landing facilities available to the ships, all stores were either brought ashore by landing ships or helicopter. Once ashore the military plans were heavily reliant on helicopters in not only supplying troops in forward areas but also moving them across the island as no roads existed other than farm tracks. The Chinook’s lifting ability was almost five times that of the next biggest helicopter employed, the Sea King, and it had been envisaged that Chinooks would ferry troops across the difficult terrain, thereby keeping them fresh for battle and bring them into action quickly.

Work to fit the blades on BN was completed in the afternoon of 25 May, and after several ground runs of her engines she departed to conduct an air test. Shortly after taking off the carrier group which included the two aircraft carriers, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible and the Atlantic Conveyor found themselves under air attack. Two Argentine Dassault Super Étendards carrying Exocet missiles approached the task force at low level with the carriers as their targets. The aircraft were picked up on the radars of the carrier group and the vessels conducted defensive manoeuvres and fired off chaff to confuse the missiles. However, Atlantic Conveyor had not been fitted with chaff dispensers and one of the missiles locked onto the Atlantic Conveyor, which was still in the process of turning to present a smaller radar profile when she was hit by the missile. A fire broke out inside the vessel that could not be contained and the ship had to be abandoned with the loss of 12 lives. The loss of the Atlantic Conveyor was a severe blow. Not only were tentage for 10,000 troops, a mile of steel runway, vehicles, aircraft and helicopter spares been lost but also six Royal Navy Wessex helicopters and perhaps most importantly three Chinooks. In his history of the Falklands Conflict, Martin Middlebrook wrote ‘the land campaign would be severely handicapped by the loss of their load carrying capacity’. The loss of the Chinooks meant that the planned swift movement of troops across the Falklands could no longer take place. The Royal Marines and Paratroopers would now have to largely march or yomp or tab their way across the Falklands.

Unable to return to Atlantic Conveyor, BN landed on the crowded deck of HMS Hermes, where her presence was not welcome. The ship’s captain threatening to have the aircraft pushed overboard if it was not removed because it would hamper the carrier’s ability to mount its own air operations. After an overnight stay the aircraft departed for the bridgehead at San Carlos.

With only one operational aircraft, No. 18 Squadron quickly had to reorganise itself. 77 members of the Squadron had arrived in the South Atlantic onboard the Atlantic Conveyor and the MV Norland. Those who had been onboard the Atlantic Conveyor were repatriated to the UK and a small detachment of two crews (two pilots and two crewmen per crew) along with 27 groundcrew who had sailed on the Norland were nominated to remain to fly and support the aircraft while four RAF Regiment personnel would guard the aircraft. However, all the spares, manuals, servicing tools and equipment had been lost, and without this equipment it was not known how long the aircraft would remain serviceable.

The detachment of groundcrew landed on East Falkland on 26 May and serviced BN after her arrival from HMS Hermes. They returned to HMS Fearless for the night to collect their kit and scrounge tools and consumables from the Royal Navy that could be used to support BN on operations. Early next morning they returned to Port San Carlos, to prepare the aircraft for flight. In between air raids a site was located from which to operate BN, Chief Technician (Chf Tech) Tom Kinsella, who commanded the ground crew detachment wrote that

‘Once a site had been decided upon it was then a question of having to hump all our personal belongings from one tuft to the next across the valley and part way uphill in order to avoid the boggy ground. ‘BN’ had only two 7×9 tents on it. A further 7×9 tent, 9×9 and 12×12 tent were borrowed from the navy. There were a number of bits missing from the two latter tents, which made it very awkward to tie them down. It didn’t take long before the 12×12 was blown uphill.’

With many air raids and then post flight servicing of BN to be done, it was night before Tom Kinsella could look to prepare his bivouac. Instead he slept in the open.

‘I assembled my camp bed, arctic roll inside my sleeping bag, waterproof cover and went to bed fully clothed and covering my boots with polyethene bags. I felt quite exhausted and even so I got little sleep because of a bombardment away on the other side of San Carlos Water…. Halfway through the night it rained and all I did was cover my head with the groundsheet sufficiently to prevent the rain from getting inside my bag.’

The groundcrews spent the first three days sleeping in the open in freezing conditions before they moved to Port San Carlos on 30 May and into the luxury of some farm outbuildings and navy tents. It was from here that the Squadron would operate for the remainder of the campaign. For the rest of the campaign the ground crew detachment continued to keep the aircraft airworthy despite the lack of equipment and tools. Chf Tech Kinsella having lost the servicing paperwork for the aircraft, used an exercise book that he managed to source as a temporary servicing Form 700. This document, now in the Museum’s collection, records how after every day flying, Tom logged the defects, that would likely have grounded the aircraft under normal operation circumstances, servicing conducted and repairs made, ending each day ‘aircraft ‘s’(afe) to fly until receipt of spares’.

BN was put to work immediately as Andy Lawless, one of BN’s four pilots recalled in a 2021 interview

‘… the first couple of days were taking stores from the ships to shore, literally underslung load after underslung load. Yes, there were a few landing craft doing this type of stuff, but we were taking the more high priority, weapons and what have you, the personal kit, not just straight onto the beachhead but to designated points where individual units were. So we could give them all the equipment, so they could be ready to breakout of the beachhead.’

This also included carrying Rapier surface-to-air missile batteries to positions around Falkland Sound to bolster the air defences of the fleet which were under continued Argentinian air attack, so much so, that the area became known as Bomb Alley.

Having been ashore for almost a week with no breakout from the beachhead, there was political pressure for action. An operation was devised to attack the Argentinian positions around the settlements of Darwin and Goose Green. BN along with Royal Navy Sea Kings began moving supplies for the assault by 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment (2 Para). BN carried 105mm guns, artillery shells, mortars and equipment forward in preparation for the attack. Despite stiff resistance, 2 Para were successful and in the aftermath of the battle BN was busy carrying the wounded to the field hospital which had been established in a disused refrigeration plant at Ajax Bay.

Two days after Goose Green, BN was involved in an audacious airlift to capture the prominent feature of Mount Kent which dominated the routes of advance from San Carlos but also overlooked the Argentinian defensive positions around Stanley, the capital of the Falklands. The SAS had reconnoitred the site and reported that it was thinly held. Brigadier Thompson, commander of 3 Commando Brigade decided an attempt should be made to capture the peak. On the night of 30/31 May, three Sea Kings carrying elements of 42 Command, and BN with three 105mm guns (two carried internally and one underslung) and 22 gunners, were to fly miles 40 miles to Mount Kent and capture the important feature.

Just prior to the operation Squadron Leader (Sqn Ldr) Langworthy had raised an issue with Tom Kinsella about an oil leak in the aft gear box, with no spares with which to repair it. Tom provided the crew with two gallons of oil with the instructions that if the situation became severe to put down and top up, with that he signed the aircraft as fit to fly as he said he was aware of the importance of the operation. Upon reflection he said ‘I should have never let it go, but, I am convinced I would have been overridden’.

BN took off into the night sky, the pilots Sqn Ldr Dick Langworthy and Flight Lieutenant (Flt Lt) Andy Lawless wearing passive night vision googles. The weather conditions were poor with frequent snow showers and intelligence vague. The crew had been informed that the landing area was flat and secure. As the aircraft approached the designated site, it was found that the site was not level but a rocky hillside. What was expected to be a 5-minute job turned out to be a 40-minute task where each gun had to be manoeuvred into position by BN. All the while the site was subject to incoming fire.

On the return flight in a severe snow shower, the aircraft suffered an altimeter failure and hit a body of water. Luckily BN was in a slightly flared attitude. The rotors wound down as the engines ingested water. Believing the aircraft had crashed, Andy Lawless prepared to evacuate by jettisoning his door. Miraculously the aircraft engines recovered, and the aircraft flew off the water. Crewman Tom Jones suffered concussion from the incident and tried to exit the aircraft at altitude and had to be restrained by his fellow crewman Gary Rogan.

The door which had been jettisoned contained maps and vital Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) codes to be used on the return to San Carlos water. Luckily Andy Lawless had memorised the route back. However, without the IFF codes the Rapier anti-aircraft missile batteries around San Carlos might have mistaken BN as an Argentinian Chinook. Andy Lawless later recalled ‘if you were not squawking the correct codes, you’ll get a Rapier up your jet pipe, which is not a good idea’. The crew needed to make the Rapier batteries aware of their approach without appearing hostile, what is termed lame duck procedures, which the pilots did by turning on and off their lights to show that they were friendly, a Sea King came and inspected BN and escorted it back to San Carlos without further mishap.

The following day a thorough inspection was made of the aircraft to look for damage. Apart from some slight damage to the ramp and aerials the aircraft was still deemed serviceable and was ready to return to operations. The cause of the oil leak was identified, and a temporary repair made which stopped the leak for the remainder of the campaign. The cockpit door, however, could not be replaced and for the rest of the campaign BN flew without the left-hand cockpit door which Andy Lawless described as ‘bloody cold’. Despite the discomfort to the aircrew, the missing door would two days later save the aircraft from near disaster.

On 2 May, BN was being used by the recently arrived 5 Brigade to help them move troops and supplies around San Carlos and Goose Green where one of their battalions was located. In a bold move Major Chris Keeble, the commanding officer of 2 Para, suggested to the Commanding Officer of 5 Brigade that a small group fly to Swan Inlet House and use the telephone to establish if the settlements of Fitzroy and Bluff Cover were occupied. If they were found unoccupied an ad-hoc operation was to be undertaken to fly in elements of 2 Para and seize the settlements.

Eager to get 5 Brigade into action, Wilson approved of the plan without consulting his superiors. The group arrived at a deserted Swan Inlet House and called Fitzroy and Bluff Cove and were told by the settlement’s manager that no Argentinians were present. Having confirmed the area was not occupied, there followed a mad dash to airlift 2 Para to the area, as recalled by Chris Keeble,

‘Brigadier Wilson wanted to capture two settlements, one was called Fitzroy and one was called Bluff Cove. So I said, “What we’ll do is a coup de main operation. We’ll fly two assault forces in, one to Bluff Cove, one to Fitzroy.” And we only had maybe 120 soldiers to secure these two settlements, so we had to do it fast, at night, and we needed to rely on the only platform that was available to do that. And that was the one surviving Chinook, Bravo November (BN) …and as we were climbing in, I needed 60 people on the Chinook and the air loadmaster said, “I’m sorry, but it’s only equipped,” I think he said “30”. So one of my Sergeant Major’s said, “Well, you can fucking get off for starters.” Of course, that was a bit rude, but he made the point that we needed 60 people on the Chinook. And we got 60 heavily loaded paratroopers on the Chinook with the ramp down and flew at low level towards Fitzroy. The coup de main was unopposed…The threat probably was the weather. The weather was appalling, and you had to be extremely skilful to fly in thick rain and to fly at night with night goggles. Requires an immense amount of skill. So, it was speed. It was the skill of the pilots to navigate at very low level across an unknown terrain, ’cause nobody, I don’t think, had flown that route before, and it enabled us to get in speedily and with surprise.’

In fact, as Tom Jones one of the crewman onboard BN remembered, BN flew two lifts one of 81 and one 71. ‘A remarkable achievement since the standard capacity was 33, exceptionally 44’. The official RAF narrative acknowledged. However, the inbound flight almost became a tragedy but for the missing cockpit door, as Jones recounted

‘…there were artillery guys attached to the marines, on the high ground to our left. They were about to open fire because they thought it (BN) was an Argentinian Chinook, and then one astute corporal said “Wait a minute, hang on, no, it’s ours, it hasn’t got a door in the left hand side of the cockpit.” So what happened disastrously nearly a day before, we suddenly found out saved our lives…’

The coup de main had rapidly progressed the southern advance, however, the move was not without risk and 2 Para were now isolated without any supporting arms, few stores and little equipment. The move had disrupted plans for the assault on Stanley and there was now an urgent need to bring the remainder of 5 Brigade to Fitzroy and Bluff Cove with all its equipment and stores to reinforce 2 Para. One officer describing the move in his diary as ‘grossly irresponsible’.

The question was how to move the rest of 5 Brigade quickly to the Fitzroy and Bluff Cove. The loss of helicopters on Atlantic Conveyor meant there were simply not enough helicopters available to support 3 Brigade and move 5 Brigade. The idea of marching the two 5 Brigade battalions from San Carlos was explored and discounted. The only other viable alternative was a risky move by sea at night. Plans were rapidly devised and the first elements of 5 Brigade sailed on the night of 6 June landing early the next day, the vessels returning to collect the remainder of the brigade. Delays in loading and poor communications meant that the ships departed late and Landing Ship Logistics RFA Sir Galahad arrived during the morning of the 8 June. The poor weather of the previous day which had helped protect Sir Galahad’s sister Ship RAF Sir Tristram had now cleared and the two ships were visible to the Argentinians, unloading continued slowly and Rapier air defence batteries had not been properly established ashore. When shortly after midday the ships came under air attack. Both ships were hit, Sir Tristram was largely empty by now but not so Sir Galahad where 48 soldiers and crew were killed, many injured and suffering burns from the fire that subsequently took hold. The casualties were brought ashore by lifeboat or winched to safety by Sea King helicopters of the Royal Navy. BN was tasked with ferrying some of the casualties to Ajax Bay as Tom Jones recalled.

‘We went in and picked up a lot of the casualties from there, amputees, badly burned and flew them to Ajax Bay. And then once they had done their initial first aid treatment with the fantastic medical team they had set up there, we then went in to pick them up and ferry them to Uganda…a hospital ship.’

BN continued to fly support helicopter operations for the remainder of the war, moving troops, supplies and ammunition in support of the ground forces as they battled toward Stanley, including carrying and replacing the Murrell Bridge near Mount Kent to enable vehicles to continue to Stanley. Tom Kinsella remembered that the morale was very high despite all the problems encountered in keeping BN operational, ‘We didn’t want to be reinforced, we wanted to see this thing through ourselves’. Which they just managed to do, two hours after the Argentinian surrender on 14 June a second Chinook arrived on the Falklands. Ironically following the surrender, No. 18 Squadron groundcrew removed the door from a captured Argentinian Chinook and fitted it to BN. BN would fly for many years with its Argentinian door.

During the 18 days ashore, BN had flown everyday bar one, carried 2,150 troops, 95 casualties, 550 prisoners of war and 550 tons of stores. In a footnote in the RAF’s official history, it was noted that the tonnage was more than the ‘total carried by an entire squadron of Sea Kings for the same period’. An amazing achievement considering the scarcity of supplies, equipment, and manuals available to the groundcrew. For his efforts on Mount Kent, Sqn Ldr Dick Langworthy was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC).

An eventful opening chapter in the long career of BN which would see a further three pilots (Steve Carr, Ian Fortune and Craig Wilson) awarded the DFC while flying Bravo November and an important and most welcome addition to the Museum’s collection.

21 May 2022
Air-to-air refuelling in the Falklands War

Operation Corporate

On Friday 2 April 1982, Argentinian military forces invaded and occupied the British Overseas Territory of The Falkland Islands. The following day, the Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, told the House of Commons – on a very rare Saturday sitting – that ‘It is the Government’s objective to see that the islands are freed from occupation and are returned to British administration at the earliest possible moment’.

Roles assigned to the RAF for Operation Corporate were reconnaissance, ground attack, transporting personnel and freight, as well as the aero-medical evacuation of those wounded during the conflict. The RAF also showed the psychological exercise of the demonstration of will and capability.

But whilst these tasks were clear, the assets to deliver them were far less so. The distances were vast. Even from the advance base at Wideawake Airfield on Ascension Island, there was no aircraft which could fly to the Falklands and return unsupported; tankers were vital and self-evidently any aircraft going that far had to be able to receive fuel from a tanker.

This limited the choice to the Avro Vulcan. However, a dwindling number of those Vulcans remained: only those which had escaped retirement to museums or the breakers blowtorch. The RAF Museum London’s own Vulcan was already a museum piece at the time.

The unsung hero : the Handley Page Victor tanker

As for tankers, there were a couple of dozen Handley Page Victor K2s, with the prime tasking of supporting the Quick Reaction Force of English Electric Lightnings, defending Britain’s Air Defence Identification Zone, principally against Soviet aircraft coming round the North Cape into the North Atlantic. VC10 tankers were not yet in service.

Quite simply, without the Victor tankers, Operation Corporate could not have been launched.

The Victor as a V-bomber

The Victor started its career in the 1950s as a strategic bomber, entering Bomber Command service in April 1958. Together with its stable-mates, the Vickers Valiant and Avro Vulcan, its primary purpose was to carry Britain’s atomic Bomb ‘Blue Danube’ (weighing 10,000 lb – 4½ tons, 4,500 kilos) to Moscow. The previous generation of RAF bombers – Handley Page Halifax, Avro Lancaster/Lincoln and Boeing B-29 Washington, which the three V-Bombers were replacing, were low, slow and fitted with guns for self-defence, whereas the 1946 Operational Requirement against which both the Victor and Vulcan were designed followed the same principle as the de Havilland Mosquito. They were to be high and fast to outperform the opposition: 500 mph (800 km/h) at 50,000 feet (15,000 metres). No Soviet fighter or anti-aircraft gun could threaten them. Later Victors achieved 620 mph (1,000 km/h) at 62,000 feet (19,000 metres).

But this invincibility was to be short-lived. On 1 May 1960, a Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft piloted by Frances Gary Powers, on loan from the United States Air Force to the Central Intelligence Agency, was shot down whilst flying over Sverdlovsk Oblast in the Ural Mountains of the USSR. Soviet air defence technology had caught up rapidly. The Soviet S-75 Dvina missile (NATO reporting name SA-2 ‘Guideline’) could probably reach 70,000 feet. Well above the ceiling of the Victors and Vulcans. The V-Bombers were no longer safe at altitude.

At the beginning of 1963, the Air Council recognised the improved Soviet air defences meant V-Bombers could no longer expect to survive at high level so introduced the need for low level attacks: instead of flying at 50,000 feet, they dropped very low – 100 feet – in heavily defended areas of the Soviet Union.

But Victors were not able to fly at low level, where their more delicate wings could not withstand the stresses of the greater turbulence.

What to do with them all? Convert them to tankers.

The need for tankers

The early 1960s saw the introduction of the English Electric Lightning into Fighter Command (before it became Strike Command). Incredibly fast at twice the speed of sound, it was also desperately thirsty. Tankers were vital to permit the Lightnings on Quick Reaction Alert to chase away the Soviet Tupolev Tu 95 ‘Bear’.

In 1965, with the sudden withdrawal from service of all Valiants due to wing fatigue caused by air turbulence at low level, early Victors were converted to tankers. Some Victors had two hoses and could still carry bombs whilst others, later all, were three-point. The latter had one on each wing and a larger Hose Drum Unit (HDU) in the bomb bay, thereby losing their bombing capability. The wing hoses were suitable only for lighter, fighter-style aircraft whereas heavier bombers and transports had to use the centre-line hose for aerodynamic reasons.

Early Victors were released for tanker conversion as the more powerful B2 variants began delivery in 1962 but in due course 24 of these B2s were themselves converted to K2 tankers – see Timeline below.

Although by Op Corporate all Victors had been converted to tankers, a retro-modified Victor carried out one of the very first offensive operations by flying a radar and visual reconnaissance mission to South Georgia.

During the combat phase of Op Corporate, every aircraft going from Ascension south to Falklands, and fighters coming from UK to Ascension, required multiple tankers. For the intricate refuelling plan for Black Buck Victor sorties, please see a recent Vulcan blog post.

On the receiving end

The following individual types participated in Op Corporate and benefited from AAR to achieve their missions:

Hawker Siddeley Nimrod MR2

The Nimrod undertook reconnaissance missions and provided navigation and Search and Rescue cover for Harriers on their over-water flights from Ascension Island to the Task Force and also for Black Buck sorties. Also providing communications with our nuclear attack submarines going ‘down south’.

These Nimrods had to have refuelling systems installed for the first time for Op Corporate so on 13 April 1982 (just 11 days after the invasion), the Ministry of Defence placed an order with Flight Refuelling Ltd to fit AAR equipment. The first test flight took place on 30 April. Nimrods had not been designed for this, nor were there any spares in stores. Just like the Vulcans, museums and scrap yards were scavenged for parts. Perhaps unbelievably, the Vulcan recently presented to Castle Air Force Base, California, was raided by RAF engineering NCOs in ‘civvies’ for plumbing bits. After the conflict, Castle AFB congratulated the RAF on this spectacular audacity. And demanded the parts be returned.

With AAR, one Nimrod remained on patrol for 19 hours.

Tragically, though, the addition of AAR plumbing was to be a factor in the loss of XV 230 over Afghanistan 24 years later: a fuel leak from refuelling causing a catastrophic fire and the deaths of all 14 service personnel aboard.

Hawker Harrier GR3

RAF front-line combat-capable strike assets in 1982 were limited to the McDonnell-Douglas F-4 Phantom, Blackburn Buccaneer and Hawker Siddeley Harrier GR 3. All three had AAR (air-to-air refuelling) capability. But it would not be reasonable to expect a pilot to fly 8,000 miles over 16 hours – even if they had the navigational capability, which they didn’t. Nor did the aircraft have sufficient oil for their engines over those distances. The only one of these three which were used was the Harrier GR3.

The RAF Harriers were initially assigned to Op Corporate as attrition replacements for any Sea Harriers lost in combat. However, losses were fortunately lower than anticipated. However, integrating these aircraft with a carrier was far from straightforward as some 30 modifications were required. Their Inertia Navigation Systems were designed to be calibrated at a known, fixed location but of course a carrier never stays still. In fact, this mating with the carrier was never achieved so the GR3 pilots relied upon ruler, pencil and ‘Mk 1 eyeball’ for bomb-aiming.

Engines lacked the special corrosion-resistant coatings that the Sea Harriers had to combat the damage from salt-laden air. Magnesium components (aluminium on Sea Harriers) reacted chemically to salt water. Naval transponders had to be fitted, holes were drilled to allow water to drain away, additional tie-down points to cope with the carriers’ rolling and pitching in heavy seas, and the nose steering gear modified. Nevertheless, despite all these modifications, a GR3 could never have been a direct substitute for a Sea Harrier as a fighter jet. Although AIM 9L Sidewinders air-to-air missiles were fitted, the Harrier did not have any radar.

Some flew from England down to the Task Force, stopping at Yandun International Airport, Banjul (Gambia) and Wideawake Airfield on Ascension Island. They used over-size fuel tanks and AAR probes but records suggest they did not fit the extension wingtips designed for just such ferry flights; one batch flew non-stop from St Mawgan to Ascension and then a few days later direct to the Task Force, making their first-ever carrier deck landing in the midst of an air alert.

Lockheed Hercules

The workhorse of the transport fleet. As well as lifting personnel and freight from UK to Ascension, they supported the Task Force by flying south and parachuting equipment not loaded before leaving the UK and key personnel including, it is said, special forces.

Marshalls of Cambridge Ltd fitted refuelling probes to 16 Hercules enabling them to fly all the way from Ascension to Stanley and return; Flight Lieutenant T Locke smashed the endurance record flying for 28 hours and 4 minutes to air-drop electrical components and missiles to a Rapier missile battery positioned around Port Stanley.

Avro Vulcan B2

At the very end of their operational lives, Vulcans were called upon to undertake what was then the longest bombing raids in the world – the nearly 4,000 miles (6,400 km) from Wideawake Airfield, Ascension Island, to Port Stanley, Falklands Islands, a 16 hour round trip – in the famous “Black Buck” raids; it took 13 Victor tankers to put one Vulcan over the target, with 15 air-to-air refuels (AAR) between the sole Vulcan and between Victors (some of the latter flying two sorties that night). As Tim Bracey will point out in his upcoming blog post on the Black Buck Shrike missions, the Vulcans did not need tanker support for their European nuclear role, so most of the plumbing had been removed and had to be replaced from spares and bits and pieces scavenged from museums and junk yards. And the current pilots had not been trained in AAR, so a sixth crew member was added – a Victor Captain qualified as an Air to Air Refuelling Instructor.

The particular Vulcans on Black Buck missions were from a batch of Mark B2s which had a number of modifications with a view to carrying the Skybolt missile (intended to replace Blue Steel but scrapped). They had more powerful Olympus 301 engines, as against the Olympus 201 of the other B2s. And as Skybolt had celestial navigation – so had to see the stars – they had to be mounted on underwing pylons so had the strengthening and wiring left over from that intended role, now enabling ECM (electronic counter measures) and anti-radiation (radar) Shrike missiles.

Although the damage to Stanley Airport in the first of the Black Buck raids was modest (one 1,000 lb bomb on the runway), the psychological impact was profound. If a Vulcan could reach Stanley, it could equally hit the mainland. So the potent Mirage fighters which had been escorting attacks on the Task Force were held back to protect the home country.

Hawker Sea Harrier FRS 1

Colloquially called ‘Shars’, the Sea Harriers were Royal Naval Air Service assets, they are included here as they did benefit from RAF tanker (Victor) and Air Sea Rescue (Nimrod) support on ferry flights.

Aircraft embarked on board HM Ships ‘Invincible’ and ‘Hermes’ did not need tanker support but No 809 Squadron flew from RNAS Culdrose to Ascension, with tanker assistance; an overnight stop was made at Yandun International Airport, Banjul, The Gambia, then onwards to Ascension. Large 330 gallon (1,500 litre) capacity ferry fuel tanks were available for each inner pylon but trials on Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton’s ski-jump showed they adversely affected trim and stability so the standard 100 gallon (450 litre) combat tanks were used. Again, there is no evidence of the larger ‘ferry wing tips’, which added lift, being fitted.

This flight was not without its moments: a SHAR losing its oxygen system so having to fly at a much lower altitude, with increased fuel consumption; another SHAR and its guiding Victor losing navigation systems so the entire formation relying upon one man in his SHAR for routing; and a Victor being unable to deploy either wing-mounted hoses so the SHARs had to use the main hose deployed from the Victor’s bomb bay: the aerodynamic effects of which were completely unknown as this had never been tested. But as one SHAR pilot said ‘what the hell, this is war’.

Aftermath

The Argentinian forces surrendered on 14 June 1982. However, the problem of the continued protection of the Falklands Islands and their population against a renewed Argentinian invasion, were UK armed forces to withdraw, now came to the fore and so a significant military capability had to remain in place, far in excess of the nominal force of Royal Marines which had been the permanent garrison before the invasion. A very significant logistical and defence challenge.

From the RAF’s perspective, that initially meant establishing a major air bridge.

Victors were being used at a quite unforeseen rate, eating into their fatigue lives. So two, somewhat drastic, measures were needed until the first VC10 tankers were due into service: convert Vulcans and Hercules to tankers.

With the Vulcans, two additional fuel tanks were installed in the cavernous bomb bay and the HDU was inserted where the ECM equipment had been in bays in the tail, aft of the rudder. The single basket was housed in a metal and wooden box below the very rear of the tail. An order was placed with British Aerospace at Woodford on 4 May and just 50 days later, 23 June, XH 561 was delivered to RAF Waddington; it undertook trials the very same day delivering fuel to another Vulcan and a Victor.

Hercules tanker

As for the Hercules, a solution – of the Heath-Robinson variety – was the contract given to Marshalls of Cambridge to convert 4 Hercules to perform the role of AAR tankers, one of which would be based at each of Stanley and Ascension.

Admittedly, the US Marine Corps had been using KC130 tankers since the early 1960s but these had been designed for the task, with additional pylons for the hoses outboard of the outer engines and the appropriate wiring and plumbing. But the RAF’s Hercules lacked these so the solution adopted by Marshalls was far quicker and more brutal: add tanks in the cargo area; put an HDU on the cargo door; and cut a hole in the door for the hose.

‘Toboganning’

Air-to-Air Refuelling is a delicate and dangerous operation, where mistakes have led to fatalities. Two large aircraft have to fly at exactly the same speed and maintain the same relative positions just dozens of metres apart – even at night and in severe turbulence.

The first propeller tanker aircraft refuelled combat aircraft which were faster than them. Jet tankers – like the Victor – solved that problem but Op Corporate and Hercules receivers produced the same problem in reverse: the Victor tankers were too fast for the Hercules receivers.

The solution was a technique known as tobogganing: the two aircraft would separately climb to altitude then dive, picking up speed. This would enable the Hercules to catch and connect with the Victor’s drogue. At a lower altitude, they would separate, climb and repeat – a number of times if necessary.

Continued service

And finally… aircraft and aircrew are, of course, the heart of the RAF but, dear reader, do spare a thought for other RAF units and personnel who are often overlooked: engineers, armourers, radar, controllers, communications, RAF Regiment, logisticians, medical etc, not forgetting drivers, cooks and clerks. They all served.

Victors continued to give sterling service right up to Operation Granby, the First Gulf War in 1991, being withdrawn for RAF service in October 1993.

But the very last ever (to date) flight of a Victor was on 25 August 2009 during a high-speed taxying run by a museum piece which got out of hand when the Victor took charge and tried to escape.

Both the RAF Museum London and Midlands have a Falklands veteran Victor tanker on display. Book your free ticket via our website to see them up close.

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER READING

RAF Historical Society Journal No 30 2003

‘THE RAF IN THE POSTWAR YEARS: THE BOMBER ROLE 1945-1970’ Humphrey Wynn, RAF Air Historical Branch

‘Harrier 809’, Rowland White, Penguin/Corgi Books 2020

‘Contact: A Victor Captain’s experiences in the RAF before, during and after the Falklands conflict’ Bob Tuxford, Grub Street Publishing

Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 1982/3

‘Falklands, Witness of Battles’, Jesus Romero [Major, Spanish Air Force] and Salvador Huertas [historian], Valencia, Spain 1985

‘Air War South Atlantic’ Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price Sidgwick & Jackson

www.victorxm715.co.uk (detailed history of AAR missions)

Multiple articles in aviation magazines

TIMELINE

1958 Victor entered RAF Bomber Command service

1960 May Powers’ U-2 brought down over Soviet Union by missile

1960 Britain joins Skybolt project

1961 February Last Victor B1 delivered

1962 First deliveries of Victor B2 to RAF

1962 first Blue Steel missiles introduced to service (on Vulcans)

1962 October Cuban Missile crisis

1962 December Skybolt cancelled

1963 January Air Council issues requirement for V-Bombers to fly at low level

1963 May last Victor B 2 delivered to RAF

1964 Victors fitted with Blue Steel

1965 January Valiants withdrawn, scrapped

1965 April first Victor tankers delivered

1969 July Strategic nuclear deterrent transferred to Royal Navy

1970 Blue Steel withdrawn from service

1974 Conversion begins of Victor B2 to K2 (tanker) standard

1975 First K2 delivered to RAF

1982 Op Corporate (Falklands)

1991 Op Granby (Gulf War I)

1993 Victors Withdrawn

2009 August Bruntingthorpe attempted escape

OPERATION CORPORATE ORDER OF BATTLE (fixed wing only)

Victor 20

VC 10 14 (UK to Wideawake and latterly Uruguay only)

Nimrod MR 2 13

Harrier GR3 10

Hercules 6

Vulcan 4

Phantom 3 (Wideawake only)

12 May 2022
The Hercules in the Falklands War

In the #Falklands40 commemorations, the Lockheed Hercules may not receive the attention of the Harriers and Vulcans of this world, but it played an essential role during the conflict.

As has been explained in previous posts, Ascension Island was the vital staging post for the recapture of the Falklands, located strategically between the UK and the Falklands. From here the Vulcan and Victors launched their Black Buck raids while the remaining (Sea) Harriers were loaded on ships steaming toward the Falklands. However, how to get supplies to Ascension Island? Or how could the Fleet be supplied while in the South Atlantic? This is where ‘the Herc’ came in.

The Hercules entered service with the US Air Force in 1956 as a heavy tactical transport aircraft powered by then-novel turboprop engines. Ever since, the Hercules and its many enlarged and improved versions have been a mainstay of Western logistics. During the Falklands, the RAF had a total of 54 Hercules transports, which operated together at RAF Lyneham, and therefore referred to as the Lyneham Wing.

The air bridge

The Hercules was the first RAF aircraft to jump to action in the Falklands War. One day after the invasion, four Hercules departed Lyneham for Gibraltar to set up an air bridge via Dakar in Senegal to Ascension Island. Goods and personnel were flown to the Island to ready it for air operations.

Another valuable mission performed by the Hercules fleet was that of air drops to the Task Force ships sailing toward the Falklands. Once the Task Force sailed south from Ascension Island, the only way of delivering urgent/vital supplies would be through Hercules flying down to it and dropping them by parachute into the sea, having provided sufficient flotation packaging to permit the stores to float until picked up by the ships.

The air drop technique always worked very well but there was one peculiar incident when the small boat sent to drag the large load alongside a destroyer for pick up, took over three hours to do the job. A killer whale had fallen in love with what the Herc had dropped. It chased off the naval boat every time it tried to get near it. It eventually took the destroyer itself to chase off the amorous orca and recover the load.

Longer legs

A more serious problem was the limited endurance of the Hercules. Remember, Ascension Island was 4,000 miles away from the UK, and it was another 3,500 miles to the Falklands. Both were beyond the range of the Herc, even without cargo. A solution was literally found. Discarded fuel tanks, once used by retired Andover and Argosy transport aircraft, were located in storage. These 825-gallon tanks were hastily installed in some Hercules aircraft, greatly increasing their range. The first extended-range Hercules deployment was on 4 May. Hercules XV196 took off from Lyneham and flew non-stop to Ascension Island. A few days later it dropped supplies over the Task Force and returned, staying in the air for over 17 hours.

Still not satisfied with the range, the RAF investigated adding an in-air refuelling probe to the Hercules. Hercules XV200 was chosen for the conversion. A probe was mounted on top of the cockpit with the equipment faired over from the fuselage roof to the starboard wing root. A Handley Page Victor tanker was flown over to test the mid-air refuelling. However, there was one obvious problem. The Vulcan’s minimum flight was higher than the Hercules’ maximum flight!

In the end a technique was developed which involved fuel being transferred in a gentle dive starting at about 20,000 feet. That way, the Victor could manage to keep down to 230 knots (265 mph) and (thanks to Isaac Newton) the Herc could bump up its normal 210 knots (242 mph) to match this. This procedure meant a prolonged descent at 500 feet per minute, the exercise usually being completed about 5,000 feet above the ocean, before commencing the long haul back up to altitude. That said, depending on the conditions, it could be a lot lower…

Six Hercules were converted before the end of the Falklands conflict. The first operational sortie with XV200 took place on 16 May. Flt Lt HC Burgoyne and his crew took off from Ascension for a 6,300-miles journey to the Task Fleet off the Falklands, and back.

The Hercules was refuelled twice by tanker aircraft; the second tanker having to be refuelled itself on the way back. Once down to about 1000 feet the Hercules depressurised, opened its ramp, and dropped 1,000 lb of supplies and eight parachutists near HSM Antelope off the Falklands. Burgoyne’s team then closed the ramp, re-pressurised, and climbed back up to cruising altitude before making a rendezvous with its third tanker halfway home. Burgoyne received the Air Force Cross for what was probably the longest air transport mission in history.

By 6 June the first two such equipped Hercules had carried out 11 missions, supporting the Task Fleet off the Falklands, each lasting at least 20 hours. The crews were prescribed the non-addictive drug Temazepam to ensure that they got some proper rest between flights. Without exception each crew member was absolutely drained, but determined and confident in their ability to undertake the task.

Every mission was given a girl’s name, such as Julie, Katie, Mary and Wilma. A drop on the islands itself, codenamed Gina, was planned for 14 June but the Argentinian forces surrendered while the Hercules was still en route.

Port Stanley

That did not end the role of the Hercules, quite the opposite. Using the captured Port Stanley airport, the Hercules were used to supply the British armed forces on the Islands. This came to a temporary halt on 14 August to allow extension and repair work to the air strip. Sorties reverted back to airdrops.

To pick up mail from the Islands an air snatch system was devised, similar to the practices of the RAF over the desert in the 1920s and 1930s. A grappling hook was attached to a 150ft nylon rope, trailing from the rear cargo door of the Hercules. The hook would engage a loop of rope suspended between two 22 ft poles positioned 50ft apart. The aircraft would run in at 50ft to snatch the rope and haul in the attached mail bag. Some 30 such snatches were carried out before RAF Stanley was reopened on 29 August.

In hindsight, the Hercules air bridge delivered essential support to the British war effort. In fact, the airlift turned out to be the biggest since the Berlin Airlift of 1948-49. The Hercules carried over 7000 tons, or 15 million pounds, of freight, including 114 vehicles, twenty-two helicopters and nearly 6000 troops and support personnel.

Both our London and Midlands site have a Hercules on display. Our London site has a front section of an American WC-130E while our Midlands site has an RAF C-130K Mk 3 on display. Book your free ticket at the bottom of our website to see them up close. And if you wish to find out more about the history of the Hercules in the RAF, have a look at this video on our YouTube channel:

10 May 2022
The Avro Vulcan: Part 3

On 1 May 1982, Britain woke up with the message by the BBC World Service that the Royal Air Force has bombed Port Stanley airport on the Falklands, occupied by the Argentinians. An incredible feat knowing that the islands were thousands of miles from the nearest airfield. This blog post will explore how the Avro Vulcan, on the eve of its replacement, was tasked with a mission it was never intended for.

The V-bomber, a nuclear deterrent during the Cold War

The Avro Vulcan is one of the most iconic and loved aircraft in RAF history. Its elegant delta wing and tremendous roar made it a popular attraction on flight shows. Its origin lay in the aftermath of the Second World War when Specification B.35/46 asked for a strategic bomber which could fly fast, far and high. Well, that’s what the Vulcan delivered.

The Avro Vulcan could fly at a maximum speed of 1,039 km/h (646 mph), close to the speed of sound, and climb up to 17,000 m (55,000 ft). This made it virtually impossible to intercept. It had a range of 4,195 km (2,607 miles) but was later equipped with an inflight refuelling capability, allowing it to strike targets deep into the Soviet Union. It could be armed with a nuclear bomb or 21 conventional 1,000 pounds (454 kg) bombs.

The Vulcan had a crew of five people: two pilots, a navigator, a radar operator and an electronic warfare operator. The latter was quite a novel role, revealing another Vulcan strength. It was equipped with radar warning equipment and electronic jamming equipment which could disrupt the Soviet radar and guided anti-aircraft missiles.

Despite these electronics, during the 1960s Soviet missile defences were becoming more effective which led to the decision to pass on the nuclear deterrence role to the Royal Navy with submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles. That is still the case today.

Too young to retire, the RAF found a new role for the Vulcan. It would fly at low altitude, so low enemy radar could not pick them up, to attack military targets closer to the frontline, such as missile sites, rail facilities, bridges, runways and railway lines, whilst area targets were aircraft on airfields, airfield buildings, airfield fuel installations and bomb stores, supply dumps and armoured fighting vehicle concentrations. The weapon of choice was a brand-new weapon, the WE177 nuclear bomb. In this capacity the Vulcan remained in service throughout the 1970s while awaiting the arrival of its intended replacement, the Panavia Tornado.

The Falklands: too far for the Vulcan?

When the Falklands Conflict erupted in 1982, the Vulcans were only weeks away from being taken out of service. Realising that it was the only bomber capable of bombing the occupied Falkland Islands from the nearest British air base, the Vulcans were called upon a last time. In fact, it was also the first and only time the Vulcan were used in combat.

However, there was a problem. A big problem! The nearest RAF station to the Falklands is 6,529 km (3,889 miles) away at RAF Wideawake on Ascension Island. To get a fully armed Vulcan to the Falklands it would require several mid-air refuels. That would also require that the tankers refuelled each other so the Vulcan could be refuelled along the way. To make matters worse, the Vulcan crews had given up training for aerial refuelling after the switch to low altitude attacks a decade earlier.

Much of the refuelling equipment was no longer available. A frantic search for parts was started, combing out RAF stations, but even further away. A couple of old Vulcans had been donated to the Americans to put in their museums. It was quickly found out these still had the refuelling probes. What followed was very embarrassing. A small team of RAF technicians hurried across the Atlantic. They arrived in civilian clothes and went sneaking around USAF museums, surreptitiously removing the Vulcan probes. At the end of the war, the RAF got a signal from Castle AFB Museum congratulating the RAF on their success … and demanding the immediate return of stolen property!

Several Handley Page Victor tankers landed at Wideawake but it was hardly an ideal RAF station. Ascension had only a single runway, nestled in between extinct volcanoes and high ground. Lining the runway was gritty volcanic dust and pumice stone, which was all too happy to be ingested by the engine intakes.

Black Buck, the Vulcan sends a message

The night of 30 April / 1 May was to be a pivotal moment during the Falklands Campaign with a planned bombing raid by a single Vulcan bomber on the Argentinian-held airfield of Port Stanley on the Falkland Islands. Three sections of Victors were formed; Red, White and Blue, and five tankers for the return flight. A most complicated refuel plan was designed to ensure that all tankers in both outbound and inbound waves would have sufficient fuel to be able to return to Wideawake. Today, in all probability a computer programme would be used for the intricate calculations but in 1982, the plan was worked out with an electronic pocket calculator. With hindsight the diagram might appear to be an obvious solution but, at the time, it was a major innovation.

13 Victors and 2 Vulcans started their engines, ready for take off at night from the single runway. ‘The deafening sound of the mighty four-jets as they struggled to get airborne must have been a spectacular sight. Ascension has not seen anything like this before.’ (Bob Tuxford) White-4 soon found out their hose was jammed and Blue-3 as reserve aircraft took its place. Shortly after, the crew of the primary Vulcan aircraft XM598, now on display at the RAF Museum Midlands, reported that they had an issue with their pressurisation, and they too had to withdraw. The reserve Vulcan under Flight Lieutenant Withers took its place.

After an hour and 45 minutes the first fuel transfer took place. The Victors of Red and White sections paired up and refuelled each other. Half of the aircraft were fully loaded with around 50,000 lbs of fuel each, while the other half was left with enough fuel to return to Ascension. The tankers of Blue Section did the same and refuelled the Vulcan.

With a five-ship formation left the next refuelling took place in the early morning. All of these took place in complete radio silence, which required tremendous discipline and confidence in each other and their own skills.

During the third refuel bracket, the aircraft had to endure a violent thunderstorm. One of the Victor’s refuelling probe broke, and was unable to take on the required fuel. The only way around it would be to reverse the action, give the fuel back to the donor Victor, flown by Bob Tuxford who would then continue the mission. Although physically and mentally exhausted, he had to go through the same dire weather conditions and connect his probe with the refuelling basket. After several minutes ‘chasing the basket’, he finally made contact and the fuel started to transfer.

The actual fuel status started to deviate further from the detailed refuelling plan. By the time Box Tuxford’s crew refuelled the Vulcan for the final time, Martin Withers stated he had not received sufficient fuel. As no more fuel or tankers were available, this was a terrible disappointment as it meant the entire mission was now compromised.

Box Tuxford consulted with his crew if they should transfer more fuel to ensure the operation was a success, even if it meant it would jeopardise their own chances making it back to Ascension. They decided to do so, allowing Martin Withers’ Vulcan to push on.

The Vulcan reaches the Falklands

Withers approached the Islands at low level to avoid radar detection. He made the final approach at 10,000 feet (3,000 m) while the Vulcan’s electronic countermeasures defeated the radar systems controlling the defending Skyguard anti-aircraft cannons. Twenty-one bombs were dropped of which one hit the runway.

One bomb may seem a poor effort but it was what was expected. The decision was taken to attack across the runway in the hope that at least one would hit. If they had flown along the length of the runway, they could have hit it with most of the bombs. But if the bombs dropped just 6 feet to either side, none would have hit the runway.

After dropping the bombs, Withers immediately headed north to a planned rendezvous with a Victor some way off the Brazilian coast near Rio de Janeiro. As they passed the British Task Force, the crew signalled the code word ‘superfuse’ indicating a successful attack at 0746Z.

So it was that the RAF fired the opening salvo in the Falklands campaign by bombing Port Stanley airfield on 1 May.

For Black Buck 1 the Vulcan was airborne for 16 hours 2 minutes, the long slot tanker for 14 hours 5 minutes while the total Victor flight time was 105 hours 25 minutes. The outbound plus the inbound waves of Victors uplifted 244,000 imperial gallons, that is 1.1 million litres. The Vulcan received 7% of the total and 20% was transferred between the Victors. At the final outbound transfer, the fuel passed to the Vulcan had passed through five different tankers.

Although the airfield was only lightly damaged, the impact was tremendous, especially mentally and politically. It sent a very stark message to Argentina. If the RAF can reach the Falklands, then it can reach Buenos Aires. As a result, they moved their Mirage fighter jets to protect the capital instead, away from the Falklands. It also meant that the Argentinians did not base fast jets on the Islands, which significantly reduced their ability to conduct offensive missions against the Royal Navy Task Force.

Although the worth of the Black Buck operations had been proven , the ability to replay the Vulcan card was limited by a couple of crucial factors . Wideawake had only limited aircraft parking space. Using all tanker capacity to conduct Black Buck raids meant no other Vulcan, Nimrod and Hercules operations could be carried out.

More Black Bucks

A few days later Black Buck 2 was carried out , with the same 2 Vulcans targeting the airfield. Later in the campaign, further Black Buck sorties were flown to neutralise an Argentine surveillance radar, using Shrike missiles that had been provided at short notice from American stocks.

Scheduled for 16 May, Black Buck 3 was cancelled before take-off due to strong headwinds. Black Buck 4 was planned for 28/29 May with Vulcan XM598, now on display at our Midlands site, as the chosen aircraft. Because no bombs were carried two additional fuel tanks could be fitted, which reduced the need for tanker support. On this occasion, however, one of the Victor tankers had a failure of their hose refuelling equipment, so the mission was aborted.

Black Buck 5 took place on 31 May with Vulcan XM597 with on board Squadron Leader McDougall and his crew, while our XM598 was the reserve Vulcan. Three runs over the target were made, so that the crew could identify the correct TPS-43 radar (making sure to avoid the one near Port Stanley town). Two missiles were launched at 6-7 miles out and the radar was identified as having stopped transmitting. Some shrapnel damaged one of the radar elements, but this was repaired quite quickly.

Black Buck 6 took place on 3 June with the same two Vulcans and their crews. McDougall flew the Vulcan over the target area for 40 minutes hoping that the TPS-43 radar would be switched on and his crew could fire the Shrike missiles. This did not happen, so with fuel reserves dropping, the Vulcan’s Air Electronics Officer (AEO) fired two of the Shrikes configured for the Skyguard radar. They hit their target, knocking out that radar and killing four soldiers.

However, the Vulcan had big problems while attempting to refuel on the way back to Ascension. The refuelling probe on the Vulcan was broken and the Vulcan had to divert to Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. The crew had to dispose of the secret codes and papers carried in the cockpit and put them into two metal containers. They depressurised the cockpit/cabin and opened the main entrance/exit hatch and threw the containers from 40,000 feet out into the South Atlantic. The crew then had great problems in closing the hatch and one of them had to hang head down, with a colleague holding onto his body, to be able to successfully close the hatch. They then had to jettison the two remaining Shrike missiles.

Once they had checked that there were no fishing vessels in range, one missile was fired, but the other stayed on its pylon. A Mayday was declared and contact with the air traffic controllers at Rio International airport attempted. This was difficult because the crew’s voices were high pitched because of the depressurised cabin. The aircraft landed safely, but only with enough fuel for one more circuit of the airport.

The Brazilian authorities held the aircraft and crew for one week and were well treated. In fact, at a reception to commemorate the Queen’s birthday on 9 June, the Brazilian Chief of the Air Staff joined in raising a glass to Her Majesty! The crew flew the Vulcan back to Ascension on the 10 June.

An afterthought

From an RAF point of view, the Falklands Conflict and Operation Black Buck were totally unexpected. For decades it only prepared itself for a nuclear exchange with the Soviets, which meant that the Vulcan crews had led a very sheltered existence within an air force which wasn’t used to going to war. It is a testament to their skills that they, like all RAF personnel, were able to adapt so quickly.

Avro Vulcan XM598 is on display at the RAF Museum Midlands, but also the RAF Museum London has a Vulcan on display. What’s more, it’s accessible to the public via our special Cold War Experience Tours. Have a look at our website for further details.

1 May 2022
The Boeing Chinook

The Boeing CH-47 Chinook Helicopter entered RAF service in November 1980. Throughout its 40 years of service the Chinook has made an immeasurable contribution to the Service, operating in every major conflict since the Falklands War, and delivering disaster relief and supporting communities across the UK. As a multifunctional workhorse, the Chinook is the backbone of Britain’s tactical logistics.

So what is the Chinook? It is a 2-engine multi-purpose twin rotor transport helicopter that was primarily developed for troop and equipment transport.

The twin rotor aspect is the most recognisable aspect of the Chinook. However, it was not a novel design. The RAF’s earlier Bristol Belvedere helicopter also used this system. So, what is the reason for it? A helicopter with a single rotor will have the tendency to rotate along the movement of the blades, a bit like a hammer thrower who rotates with the chained ball. Most helicopters have a tail rotor which pushes back, keeping the helicopter stable. Pushing harder or relaxing allows the helicopter to turn left or right. With two rotors rotating in opposite directions the need for a tail rotor is eliminated, allowing all power to be used for lift and thrust.

Two turboshaft engines were placed on either side of the rear pylon. They each had around 2,200 hp each, around the same as a late-war Spitfire, but a modern Chinook now has twice that. Turboshaft engines are essentially jet engines but they are connected via gearbox and several shafts to a combining gearbox in front of the rear pylon. From here shafts go to both rotors which have their own gearbox. These gearboxes reduce the engines’ speed of around 15,000rpm to the rotors’ much calmer rotational speed of 225rpm which gives the Chinook its distinctive ‘wokka’ sound. Also, if one of the Chinook’s turboshaft engines fail, the other can drive both rotors.

What’s more, the ability to adjust power to either rotor makes it able to carry more weight in the front or back of the helicopter. That is an important benefit to cargo lifting and dropping. It also allows the Chinook to perform one of its trademark moves, ‘the pinnacle’. This manoeuvre sees the Chinook setting its rear wheels onto a ridge or cliff edge with the front still in the air. It allows troops on or off the helicopter while it hovers and looks incredible.

Also instantly recognisable is the large pylon at the rear. The rear rotor is placed higher than the front to reduce the air disruption from the front rotor on to efficiency of the rear rotor. The Chinook’s automatic flight control system (AFCS) stabilises and provides autopilot functions, making the Chinook a relatively ‘easy’ helicopter to fly.

The design is optimised for maximising internal space. The fuselage is 15.25m long with the cockpit at the front, with a door to each side, a ramp on the other end, and a massive cargo bay in between. It’s 9.3m long, 2.29m wide and 1.98m tall, so big enough to take a vehicle or up to 24 stretchers. It had a maximum payload of around 10,000 lb (4,500 kg) though current versions can carry twice that much. Beneath the airframe are three external hooks that can be used individually or together.

The Chinook is lightly armoured, protecting it against small arms fire from below. There is also the ability to place machine guns in the side doors and at the rear. Modern Chinooks carry sophisticated anti-missile defences.

It was these design features that interested the American armed forces when they were looking for a new helicopter. Back in 1956 a replacement was sought for the H-37 helicopter, license-produced in the UK as the Westland Wessex. Vertol, later taken over by Boeing, submitted their twin rotor Model 107, which was chosen. The US Navy ordered it as the CH-46 Sea Knight but the US Army wanted a larger helicopter. The result was the Chinook as we know it today.

It was taken into service in 1962 by the US Army and became an important workhorse during the Vietnam war. It was used to carry heavy loads such as artillery guns to remote jungle areas or to recover downed aircraft. Its operational success led to its adoption by forces around the world. Well over a thousand Chinooks have been delivered to friendly armed forces such as Australia, Egypt, Greece, Iran, Italy, Japan, Morocco, the Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, South Korea and of course the United Kingdom.

The UK ordered 30 CH-47C ‘choppers’ as the Chinook HC1, which stands for Helicopter, Cargo, Mk 1. No.18 Squadron was the first operational squadron to be equipped with the Chinook in August 1981. A few months later the Falklands conflict erupted, and the Squadron was soon involved, flying stores and supplies to ships of the task force being assembled at Devonport. This included flying a 5-ton propeller bearing to HMS Invincible at sea in the English Channel, having very publicly departed Portsmouth the day before, thus avoiding an embarrassing return to port for repair.

Helicopters were to play an important part in any operation to recapture the Falklands, but the Royal Navy lacked a heavy lift helicopter and the RAF’s Chinooks were the only aircraft that could fulfil this capability gap. Six aircraft were rapidly prepared to join the Task Force, receiving modifications which improved the aircrafts’ survivability and operational capabilities. This included the installation of chaff dispensers, infra-red flare decoy dispensers, radar warning receivers and fittings for a machine gun. Four Chinooks were carried on board the Atlantic Conveyor cargo ship toward the Falklands.

One Chinook stayed on Ascension Island, the staging post between Britain and the Falklands. A Soviet spy ship was anchored near the island, and it was suspected that they were passing on information to the Argentinians. The ship had a large white superstructure housing all its aerials. A Chinook pilot offered to fly out in his helicopter to donate a bottle of malt to the Russian captain and then perhaps inadvertently ‘blast the superstructure and aerial to blazes’ with his downwash. It remained a plan. Luckily, as it would later appear that the Soviets had not been helping the Argentinians.

While the soldiers landed on the Falklands on 21 May, the Chinooks stayed on board. Few people understood the capability of the Chinook until it was too late. The Chinook’s lifting ability was almost five times that of the next biggest helicopter employed, the Sea King, and it had been envisaged that Chinooks would ferry troops across the difficult terrain, thereby keeping them fresh for battle and bring them into action quickly.

However, it took until 25 May when the first Chinook ‘Bravo November’ was made ready. After several ground runs of her engines she departed to conduct an air test. Shortly after taking off, the Atlantic Conveyor found itself under air attack and the three remaining Chinooks were lost in the fire. The loss of the Chinooks meant that the planned swift movement of troops across the Falklands could no longer take place. The Royal Marines and Paratroopers would now have to largely march or yomp or tab their way across the Falklands.

Unable to return to Atlantic Conveyor, Bravo November landed on the crowded deck of the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes, where her presence was not welcome. The ship’s captain threatened to have the Chinook pushed overboard if it was not removed because it would hamper the carrier’s ability to mount its own air operations. After an overnight stay the aircraft departed for the bridgehead at San Carlos.

With only one operational aircraft, No. 18 Squadron quickly had to reorganise itself. Ground and air personnel were selected but all the spares, manuals, servicing tools and equipment had been lost, and without this equipment it was not known how long the aircraft would remain serviceable.

The groundcrews spent the first three days sleeping in the open in freezing conditions. For the rest of the campaign, they continued to keep the aircraft airworthy despite the lack of equipment and tools. Chief Technician Tom Kinsella having lost the servicing paperwork for the aircraft, used an exercise book as a log book. This document, now in the Museum’s collection, records how after every day flying, Tom logged the defects, that would likely have grounded the aircraft under normal operation circumstances, servicing conducted and repairs made, ending each day ‘aircraft ‘s’(afe) to fly until receipt of spares’.

On 30 May the Chinook suffered an oil leak in its gear box. With no spares to repair it, Tom provided the crew with two gallons of oil with the instructions that if the situation became severe to put down and top up. With that he signed the aircraft as fit to fly: ‘I should have never let it go, but, I am convinced I would have been overridden’.

That night the weather was poor with frequent snow showers. The plan was to capture the prominent feature of Mount Kent which dominated the routes of advance from San Carlos but also overlooked the Argentinian defensive positions around Stanley, the capital of the Falklands. Bravo November carried three 105mm guns (two carried internally and one underslung).

On the return flight, the aircraft suffered an altimeter failure and hit a body of water. The rotors wound down as the engines ingested water. Believing the aircraft had crashed, co-pilot Andy Lawless prepared to evacuate by jettisoning his door. Miraculously the aircraft engines recovered, and the aircraft flew off the water.

The door which had been jettisoned contained maps and vital Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) codes to be used on the return. Without the IFF codes the British Rapier anti-aircraft missile batteries might have mistaken Bravo November as an Argentinian Chinook. The crew needed to make the Rapier batteries aware of their approach without appearing hostile, what is termed lame duck procedures, which the pilots did by turning on and off their lights to show that they were friendly. For his efforts on Mount Kent, pilot Squadron Leader Dick Langworthy was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC).

The following day a thorough inspection was made of the aircraft to look for damage. Apart from some slight damage to the ramp and aerials the aircraft was still deemed serviceable and was ready to return to operations. The cause of the oil leak was identified, and a temporary repair made which stopped the leak for the remainder of the campaign. The cockpit door, however, could not be replaced and for the rest of the campaign the sole Chinook flew without the left-hand cockpit door which Andy Lawless described as ‘bloody cold’.

Despite the discomfort to the aircrew, the missing door would two days later save the aircraft from near disaster. As crew member Tom Jones recounted ‘…there were artillery guys attached to the marines, on the high ground to our left. They were about to open fire because they thought BN was an Argentinian Chinook, and then one astute corporal said “Wait a minute, hang on, no, it’s ours, it hasn’t got a door in the left hand side of the cockpit.” So what happened disastrously nearly a day before, we suddenly found out saved our lives…’

Bravo November continued to fly support helicopter operations for the remainder of the war, moving troops, supplies and ammunition in support of the ground forces as they battled toward Stanley. Tom Kinsella remembered that the morale was very high despite all the problems encountered in keeping BN operational, ‘We didn’t want to be reinforced, we wanted to see this thing through ourselves’. Which they just managed to do, two hours after the Argentinian surrender on 14 June a second Chinook arrived on the Falklands. Ironically following the surrender, No. 18 Squadron groundcrew removed the door from a captured Argentinian Chinook and fitted it to Bravo November. It would fly for many years with its ‘Argentinian door’.

During the 18 days ashore, Bravo November had flown everyday bar one, carried 2,150 troops, 95 casualties, 550 prisoners of war and 550 tons of stores. In a footnote in the RAF’s official history, it was noted that the tonnage was more than the ‘total carried by an entire squadron of Sea Kings for the same period’. An amazing achievement considering the scarcity of supplies, equipment, and manuals available to the groundcrew.

As said, Sqn Ldr Dick Langworthy received the DFC but the long career of Bravo November would see a further three pilots awarded the DFC while flying it. The arrival of Britain’s most famous helicopter to the RAF Museum Midlands is therefore a privilege and a most welcome addition to the Museum’s collection.

The achievements of that sole Chinook concreted the Chinook’s reputation. Ever since, the Chinook has always been a first-choice aircraft whenever the British armed forces have been called upon. That became evident during the Gulf War of 1991.

The Chinook was now considered a vital tool to move troops into the region, and toward their starting positions, and once the ground offensive had started, to keep them supplied as they moved deeper into Iraq and Kuwait. It was a Chinook which was used to transport a Special Air Service (SAS) patrol on the infamous Bravo Two Zero mission. In the aftermath of the conflict Chinooks delivered food and supplies to thousands of Kurdish refugees from Iraq.

During the mid-1990s, Boeing upgraded the existing HC1s to the HC2 standard with more powerful engines, improved avionics, infrared jammers, missile approach warning indicators, chaff and flare dispensers, a long-range fuel system and machine gun mountings.

In 1999 the Chinooks were instrumental in bringing in NATO peacekeeping forces into Kosovo after Yugoslav forces retreated. They also transported Kosovar refugees to safety and brought supplies and relief to the stricken country. The next year the Chinooks were again in action when they evacuated thousands of civilians from Freetown in Sierra Leone.

In 2003 they received the ability to operate in darkness with better navigational units, thermal imagers, moving map displays and night vision goggles. During the invasion of Iraq that year, a formation of five Chinooks spearheaded a joint forces assault with the US Marines on the Al Faw Oil refinery to prevent an act of environmental terrorism by Iraqi forces. Over the next three days the Chinooks averaged 19 flying hours a day. This was the largest helicopter assault in RAF history and the first opposed helicopter assault since the Suez Crisis in 1956.

To many people the Chinook is most associated with the conflict in Afghanistan where the Chinook was the principal airborne workhorse for almost two decades. The conflict saw the Chinook as the main air ambulance. As a flying emergency room, it saved the lives of many injured soldiers and Afghan civilians across the Helmand province by swiftly flying them back to the hospital in Camp Bastion. To some extent air transport was more important in this theatre of war because of the omnipresence of roadside bombs (IEDs) which gravely hindered normal road transport. In Afghanistan, the Chinook Force flew over 41,000 hours, extracted 13,000 casualties and its crews have been awarded numerous gallantry awards.

In 2014, the Chinooks distributed relief aid to thousands of Iraqi refugees trapped on a mountain in northern Iraq. The RAF dropped aid packages to stricken members of the Yazidi community hiding from Deash. But also closer to home the Chinook comes to the rescue of those in need. In June 2019, a Chinook was deployed to tackle the floods in Lincolnshire, dropping 1-ton gravel bags to create an artificial dam.

Around 10 years ago the Chinooks entered the digital age when their systems were upgraded with multifunction displays, a digital moving map display, an infrared detector, as well as (again) more powerful engines. In 2015, 14 new Chinook HC6 helicopters were purchased while several existing Chinooks were upgraded to a similar standard.

The Chinook is currently employed in Mali to support the French-led fight against jihadis. No. 1310 Flight is performing a range of missions from the transport of passengers and freight between main operating bases, to the insertion of troops to desert locations. To achieve this the detachment regularly overcomes the challenges of the environment, ranging from intense desert thunderstorms to searing heat, with temperatures regularly peaking above 40 degrees and seasonal flooding.

The RAF has not grown tired of the Chinook. Quite the opposite, it has ordered several new Chinooks with an advanced digital cockpit, a modernised airframe to increase stability and improve survivability, and a Digital Flight Control System, allowing pilots to hover in areas of limited visibility. A Sustainment Programme aims to extend the lives of existing Chinook for at least another 20 years, taking the Chinook fleet beyond 2040.

The RAF Museum Midlands has recently taken ownership of Bravo November and is now on public display. Come and visit Britain’s most famous helicopter.

1 April 2022
The Avro Vulcan: Part 2

In my previous blog post I went over the early career of the Avro Vulcan. Designed as a high-altitude bomber with a nuclear payload, the Vulcan B1 was a magnificent weapon. However, technology of the 1950s and 1960s advanced rapidly and the Vulcan became too vulnerable against the latest Soviet air defences. This became painfully clear on Labour Day in 1960 when an American U-2 high-altitude spy plane was shot down by a surface-to-air missile. The Soviets also operated the supersonic MiG-21 interceptor which would have made the Avro Vulcan an easy target.

Various ways were devised to increase the survivability of the Vulcan. The improved B2 version had already received more powerful engines, a modified wing, inflight refuelling, and electronic jamming equipment. The latter would disrupt the Soviet air defences and increase its chances in hostile airspace. It was equipped with a Blue Diver low-band jammer, a Red Shrimp high-band jammer, a Green Palm VHF voice communications jammer, a Blue Saga radar warning receiver, chaff dispensers and a Red Steer tail-warning radar, derived from the radar used on Meteor night-fighters. The Divers would deny the Soviets early warning, the Shrimps negate their antiaircraft missiles and guns and Green Palm disrupt the Soviet VHF-based air defence network.

Most importantly was the Blue Steel stand-off weapon. This missile could be launched at 100 nautical miles from a heavily defended target and it could independently fly towards it at an altitude of 70,000 feet and a speed of Mach 2.5. It carried a 2-megaton bomb, capable of obliterating several Hiroshimas in a single strike. Blue Steel became the spearhead of the RAF’s Quick Reaction Alert concept. This QRA meant that there were always Vulcan crews and nuclear-armed aircraft on standby, ready to get into the air in minutes when the alarm sounded. Together they formed Britain’s primary nuclear deterrent.

The next step was to be the adoption of a longer-range standoff weapon, again increasing the survivability of the Vulcan. The UK joined the American Skybolt program in 1960 for a ballistic missile to be carried by the Avro Vulcan bomber. Armed with Britain’s own Red Snow warhead, it could be launched 970 km (600 miles) from the target. When the Americans unilaterally cancelled the programme, the Vulcan was left without an alternative upgrade. This led to a diplomatic rift within the Special Alliance, known today as the Skybolt Crisis. An emergency meeting between parties from the US and UK was called, leading to the Nassau agreement in which Britain was offered the advanced Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile.

Although Britain’s nuclear deterrence had its credibility restored, this role would go from the Royal Air Force to the Royal Navy. This remains the situation today as the Royal Navy has four submarines armed with Trident II D-5 ballistic missiles, each with up to 14 nuclear warheads, and able to be fired underwater. A recent political decision has been taken to continue this weapon system although this author wonders if spending £200 billion on building new nuclear-armed submarines in a post-Cold War era is a viable alternative to using this money on increasing the living standards of Britain’s population, funding the NHS and tackling global warming.

The Vulcan re-invented

While awaiting the introduction of the Polaris missile system the Vulcan flew on… at lower altitude. Soviet missile defences had become so effective that in 1966, despite the improvements of the B2, Vulcans switched from high-to-low-level penetration. Flying at low level through the European valleys would allow the Vulcan to remain undetected by Soviet radar. Although the Vulcan was capable of doing so, it was not a comfortable ride for its crews. The large wing gave the Vulcan excellent performance at high altitude but at low altitude it was a bumpy ride. Speed was also reduced to a mere 650 km/h (400 mph).

While Polaris was to be attack targets deep within the Soviet Union, the Vulcan crews of the eight operational squadrons were tasked with attacking military targets closer to the frontline. It would then attack them with a brand-new weapon, the WE177 nuclear bomb. Individual targets for WE177s were soft missile sites, rail facilities, bridges, runways and railway lines, whilst area targets were aircraft on airfields, airfield buildings, airfield fuel installations and bomb stores, supply dumps and armoured fighting vehicle concentrations.

Interestingly, the RAF considered the 10-kiloton bomb, although of a similar strength to what was dropped over Japan in 1945, insufficient to destroy such targets. It was only adequate if used against soft pinpoint targets such as unhardened missile sites. Indeed, the fatal radius of such a bomb was less than a mile in diameter. Dropping a bomb just a handful of seconds too late would mean the target would probably remain operational. If you are interested in finding out more about the WE177, I can recommend the upcoming virtual lecture by Dr Thomas Withington.

The Vulcan had found a new breath of fresh air, albeit with a slight nuclear taste. For the duration of the 1970s the Vulcan crews trained in their aircraft while new aircraft, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, were brought into service. The Blackburn Buccaneer, McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II and the Sepecat Jaguar were more advanced strike aircraft. And yet, the Vulcan crews were sent across the world to participate in prestigious training and competitions.

None were most prestigious than Giant Voice in which they competed with their American colleagues. Four aircraft with crews were invited to compete. In 1978 they were tasked to fly across most of the Southern States at night, find the target and bomb it as accurately as possible. Using radar navigation and bombing technology derived from that used in the Avro Lancasters of the Second World War and even using celestial sextants, they were up against the most modern fighting force in the world. The RAF has a long history of making do with what they had, and the crews rose to the occasion in these competitions.

Following their experiences in Vietnam, the Americans developed a realistic operational training programme in which air defence fighters, radars, electronic counter measures, guns and missiles simulated Soviet air defences and used their operating procedures. The concept became known as Red Flag and was conducted over the Nevada desert. The RAF was invited to participate. It selected the best crews to participate. It was then no surprise that when the Vulcan were sent to war in 1982, these were the crews sent to the Falklands.

The Falklands crisis happened at a time when the Vulcan was only weeks away from retirement, while awaiting the new Panavia Tornados. Realising that it was the only bomber capable of reaching the occupied Falkland Islands from the nearest British airfield, the Vulcans were hurried into combat. Incidentally, it was the first and last time the Vulcan was to be used operationally. But that is a story for the next blog post, which will appear as part of our online Falklands 40 campaign.

12 March 2022